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Recent Decisions
in criminal cases and the submission of this nebulous concept to the
jury.24
Bart Max Beier
INSURANCE CONTRACT-BURGLARY-The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has upheld recovery on a Homeowner's Policy to indemnify the
perpetrator of a crime for damages not intentionally caused in the
course of a burglary.
Eisenman v. Hornberger, 438 Pa. 46, 264 A.2d 673 (1970).
On the night of February 4, 1960, Alton Raymond Hornberger, seven-
teen, and other youths, broke into the Eisenman house and stole a
quantity of liquor. To avoid possible detection, the boys lit matches
instead of turning on the lights. As the matches burned down, they
were dropped or thrown on the floor. Though there was no sign of fire
when the boys left, apparently one of the matches became lodged in a
stuffed chair. A fire resulted which enveloped the house, destroying
all the personal property. Eisenman initiated an action for damages
against Hornberger and was awarded a verdict. A writ of execution
against Hornberger was returned nulla bona, defendant without suffi-
cient funds.
When Hornberger committed the burglary, he was included under
his father's Homeowner's Policy issued by the Royal Insurance Co.,
Ltd. Under the terms of the policy, Royal agreed "to pay on behalf
of the insured all sums which insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of ... property damages . . . ."I Property dam-
age is defined in the policy as "injury to or destruction of property,"
and is in no way limited to property of the insured.2 An exclusionary
clause released the insurer from liability for any property damage
caused "intentionally by or at the direction of the insured."3
24. Subsequent to Embry the United States Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court have pointedly referred to the possibility that due process might require
that a criminal presumption be factually accurate beyond a reasonable doubt. Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1970); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Common-
wealth v. Owens, - Pa. -, 271 A.2d 230 (1970).
1. Eisenman v. Hornberger, 438 Pa. 46, 48, 264 A.2d 673, 674 (1970).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 49, 264 A.2d at 674.
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Hornberger being judgment proof, Eisenman initiated a judgment
execution proceeding against Royal Insurance Co. and a judgment on
the pleading was entered for $25,000-the extent of the policy.
The insurance company appealed, claiming no liability under the
Homeowner's Policy. Appellant argued Hornberger's acts were inten-
tional and excluded from coverage; or if the cause was not intentional,
it would be against public policy to allow recovery for property dam-
aged during a burglary. Rejecting both contentions, the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment execution proceeding of the lower court.
In Pennsylvania an insurance policy is a contract.4 Courts in con-
struing contracts, must accept them as written and cannot give either
party more than he bargained for.5 With insurance contracts however,
Pennsylvania has strongly adhered to interpretations favoring the
insured6 since the policies are drafted by the insurer.7 Due to the in-
sured's restricted bargaining power all uncertainty or ambiguity is
resolved against the insurer.8
Interpreting the exclusionary clause for the first time, the Eisen-
man court adopted the majority viewY The court found a distinc-
tion between intending an "act" and intending a "result" and the
policy directs itself to the latter.10 Following the majority view, injury
or damage is "caused intentionally" within the meaning of the policy
if the insured acted with specific intent to harm a third party.,' Before
the exclusionary clause can disclaim liability, the insured must be
shown to have intended to produce the damage that occurred.12 In the
present case, the damage resulted from dropping matches lit with no
apparent intent to damage property. The facts warrant no showing
of specific intent to defeat the claim under the policy.13 In adopting
the requirement of specific intent to effectuate the exclusionary clause,
4. Cleland Simpson Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, 392 Pa. 67, 140 A.2d 41 (1958).
5. Union Paving Co. ex rel. U.S. Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 186 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1951).
6. Armon v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 369 Pa. 465, 87 A.2d 302 (1951).
7. Grissom, A Lawyer's Interpretation of the Insurance Policy Language, 26 INs.
COUNSEL J. 129, 133 (1959).
8. Blue Anchor Overall Co. v. Pa. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 385 Pa. 394, 123 A.2d
413 (1956).
9 Morrill v. Gallagher, 370 Mich. 578, 122 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Crull v. Glieb, 382
S.W.2d 17 (1964, Mo. App.); Baldinger v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 526,
222 N.Y.S.2d 736, aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 1026, 230 N.Y.S.2d 25, 183 N.E.2d 908 (1961); See also,
2 A.L.R. 3d 1243 (1965).
10. Eisenman v. Hornberger, 438 Pa. 46, 49, 264 A.2d 673, 674 (1970).
11. 2 A.L.R. 3d 1243 (1965).
12. Id.
13. Eisenman v. Hornberger, 438 Pa. 46, 49, 264 A.2d 673, 674 (1970).
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the court was consistent with its past treatment of liability insurance
policies.' 4
Assuming the act was not intentional, would it violate public policy
to allow recovery? Pennsylvania has taken a liberal view of the public
policy issue and recovery under insurance policies.' Recovery has
been upheld under automobile insurance policies even though the
accident occurred subsequent to theft of the car.' 6 Finding Hornberger
within the scope of the insurance policy, the court looked no further:
"It does not matter under what circumstances liability might arise.
The insured may even be protected against acts ... that may involve
a criminal statute.' 7 Analogizing recovery under automobile insurance
policies though the claims arose from moving violations of the Motor
Vehicle Code, the court found: "sanctions of criminal law and the
coverage of an insurance policy are collateral issues, addressing them-
selves to quite separate and distinct actions on the part of the in-
sured."' 8 There was no evidence the policy was procured in contem-
plation of any crime, nor can one say the crime was prompted by the
policy.' 9 The act triggering liability was not the burglary, but the un-
conscious dropping of matches. Denial of recovery would not serve
to deter crime.2 0 The policy does not alleviate the insured from the
consequences of his criminal act,21 but makes the innocent victim
whole.
Assuming the court is correct in adopting the majority rule, can
one say the insured did not know property would be damaged by
dropping lit matches? Intentional interference with the property of
another exists if the actor intends to do the harm or if he knows with
substantial certainty harm may occur.22 Although the insured didn't
intend the result, he should have known with substantial certainty the
fire could occur. A seventeen year old obviously should know a fire
may result from dropping lit matches. If this was established by the
insurance company, the court could have enforced the exclusionary
clause denying recovery.
14. Armon v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 369 Pa. 465, 87 A.2d 302 (1951).
15. Erb v. Commercial Mut. Acc. Co., 232 Pa. 215, 81 A. 207 (1911); Beley v. Pa. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202 (1953).
16. Sky v. Keystone Mut. Cas. Co., 150 Pa. Super. 613, 29 A.2d 230 (1942).
17. Brower ex rel. v. Employers' Liability Assurance, 318 Pa. 440, 442, 177 A. 826, 827(1935).
18. Eisenman v. Hornberger, 438 Pa. 46, 50, 264 A.2d 673, 675 (1970).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Ranson v. Kitner, 31 Ill. App. 241 (1889).
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The public policy argument denying recovery appears to be com-
pelling. The insured was committing a burglary when the damage
occurred. Recovery on the policy relieved the wrongdoer of financial
responsibility entirely. Despite the burglary, an insurer has no re-
course against its insured because it is precluded from subrogating
against itself.23 If recovery is permitted, are we not allowing a wrong-
doer to benefit from his act?
Absent a "violation of law" clause in the policy, the fact insured was
in the course of a crime is immaterial. Premiums are paid for the sole
purpose to indemnify the insured for damages, as defined by the policy.
Once it is determined the insured's act is within the scope of the policy
it is not necessary to look further. By analogy, automobile insurance
would never be purchased if insurers retained a right of subrogation.
In allowing recovery, the court properly directed itself to the terms of
the policy finding no evil consequences. Having written the policy, the
insurance company could have protected itself by including a violation
of law clause. Courts will not take the liberty to rewrite insurance con-
tracts, particularly when the party seeking greater protection is the
insurer.
James L. Ross
ESTATE LAW-TESTAMENTARY RIGHTS OF AN ADOPTED GRANDCHILD
ADOPTED AFTER THE DEATH OF THE TESTATOR-The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has held that a testator's grandchild, who was adopted
after the testator's death, was entitled to share in a testamentary dis-
position of trust income to his daughter's children, if any, after her
death. The Court allowed this distribution where it was clearly shown
that the testator knew at the time he executed his will that his daughter
could have no children and already had adopted one, who subsequently
died.
Chambers Estate, 438 Pa. 22, 263 A.2d 746 (1970).
The testator, James B. Chambers, died on May 6, 1933, leaving a will
that created a trust, the income derived therefrom to be delivered
semi-annually to Hazel G. McGill, his daughter, during her life. At
23. J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSUANcE LAW AND PRACTIE § 4932 (1962).
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